

'Interiorized' Space

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By

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Abstract

This paper examines Aldo van Eyck's approach to space. This approach gets essentially identified with, and accordingly explained on the basis of, Van Eyck's notion of an 'interiorization' of space and his concept of 'In-between', and with the way of how the latter complements the first. This explanation includes the explanation of how Van Eyck's notion of interiorized space is related to Henri Bergson's, and the concept of 'In-between' to Martin Buber's philosophy. Furthermore, the paper analyses Van Eyck's reference to (the perception of) spatiality, and argues that it is combination of that notion of an 'interiorization' of space, and the concept of 'In-between', with this reference to spatiality that essentially characterizes van Eyck's experience-oriented approach to space and its application on architectural design.¹

1 'Interiorized' Space: Aldo van Eyck's experience-oriented approach to space

1.1. Introduction

In Aldo Van Eyck's writings on architecture an appreciation of space in itself – in the sense of describing the fundamental condition of a three-dimensional extension of air space and any other kind of matter - is not to be found. As it goes for Team 10 in general, Van Eyck focused on human experience and activity *in* space rather than on the perception or experience *of* space. What is more - and targeting at the notion of space and spatiality as it developed within the early 20th century movement of modern architecture - Van Eyck explicitly rejected to refer to space in itself, both in general and in design-related terms. Instead, he argued for replacing the term space by that of place. For him, space was *'an abstraction. It is only when we see space as a place where it's good to be that we have included man in the concept of space. So you could call space in the image of man 'place'*.² However, and next to eventually modifying his general rejection of the term space in later years,³ Van Eyck's experience-oriented approach to space very well includes the recognition of an aesthetic, perception-oriented reference to spatiality.

By (rightly) identifying the 'modernist' notion of space with the attempt to refer to space in itself, and with a reference to spatiality that more or less neglects the aspect of enclosure, Van Eyck traces back this approach to a specific rationality or way of thinking: a *'... Euclidean or classical way of thinking'*.⁴ He describes this thinking as to be fundamentally wrong, since for him it largely abstracted from the immediateness of reality, from the realm of immediate experience, from intuition and imagination. He proposes a counter concept: a thinking that just starts from and centers on experience, on intuition and imagination, and from which the principal replacement of 'space' by 'place' is one essential element, as is the principle unity of space and time. In developing this approach, Van Eyck directly refers to three different sources: the early-20th century avant-garde movement, the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941)

¹ The present paper is a considerably shortened version of the 5th chapter of my dissertation: *Concerning space formation – and its socio-spatial aesthetics. A critical examination of approaches to space and space formation within the development of modern architecture*. Due to this reduction, the line of argumentation is simplified. Next to this, the discussion of two basic principles of Van Eyck's general argumentation - which is the 'coincidence of architecture and man' and the notion of 'twin-phenomena', and which both help to more closely understand the concepts of 'In-between' - are completely left aside. The same goes for the comparison with the corresponding approaches of August Schmarsow and Walter Gropius and for the evaluation of Van Eyck's approach in relation to Peter and Alison Smithon's and Jaap Bakema's perspective on the notion of 'doorstep'.

² Van Eyck [1961] 2010, 296.

³ In the early 80's Van Eyck corrects his categorical rejection of the term space and its replacement by the term place. See: Transparency, in: Van Eyck 2010, 494-96.

⁴ Van Eyck [1959] 2010, 199.

and the Austrian-Israeli philosopher of religion Martin Buber (1878-1965). His experience-oriented approach to space, however, he first and foremost develops on the basis of Bergson's concept of time as 'durée' (duration), and Buber's 'dialogisches Prinzip' (dialogic principle) and the corresponding concept of 'Zwischen' (between). Despite the different nature of these concepts, they coincide - and what seems to have made them so attractive for Van Eyck - in the perspective of the subjective human being: in the case of Bergson, the perspective of immediate perception and experience; in the case of Buber, the perspective of immediate mental belonging and identification.

1.2. Durée: Henri Bergson's concept of time

Following Francis Strauven, Van Eyck embarked on a study of Bergson's concept, or rather theory, of time, in the early 1950s. Indeed, with his concept of the "interiorization" of space and time - and which he developed in the early 1960s - Van Eyck particularly adopted Bergson's concept of time, even though he eventually transformed this concept by transferring it onto space, or space-time.⁵

Bergson's concept of time, conceiving space as 'durée' (duration), forms the keystone of his philosophy of life, and by which he became one of its main protagonists at the end of the 19th century.⁶ Accordingly, Bergson develops and formulates his notion of time in contrasting juxtaposition to natural science and an associated way of thinking. As Christina Vagt puts it: '*Bergson's theory of duration ... simply is the other, the to natural science complementary side, a method of conscious life, and to capture the realness, the actuality of corporeal-mental existence.*'⁷ For Bergson, duration represents real time, because it is intuitively perceived. It is heterogeneous and implies the realm of immediate and inner experience. By contrast, a scientific notion of time, based on intellect, or analytic reasoning, misses, according to Bergson, that level of immediate and inner experience. It is oriented towards the outer world, outside of consciousness, and thus separated from inner being and experience.⁸ Bergson links the distinction between these two notions of time to a qualitative distinction between time and space, that is, to a dualism between both, as Alan Lacy states.⁹ As Bergson connects duration with intuition, he ties intellect to space. This is because matter - the subject to which the intellect is generally directed - exists for and is analyzed by our consciousness first and foremost in its spatial appearance, as it is conceived as discrete 'objects' existing in space next to each other and, at the same time, time-independent. Based on this intrinsic relation he draws between space and intellect, for Bergson the intellectual perception (concept) of time actually does not represent time at all, but rather integrates time into space. Like matter, or turning now into matter, time - as soon as it is intellectually conceived - gets by means of measuring and counting separated into a sequence of discrete moments of spatial events.

1.3. 'Interiorized' time

As indicated above, Van Eyck primarily shares with Bergson his focus on and preference for intuition, and the corresponding challenge of a primarily rational and scientific-theoretical understanding of reality.

⁵ Even though Van Eyck clearly adopted Bergson's concept of time, he never referred to this explicitly anywhere. The only clear reference to Bergson was not at all related to this conception. We find it already in Van Eyck's contribution to the official report of the CIAM meeting in Bridgewater in 1947. Here he takes over a quote from Carola Giedion-Welcker, who herself mentioned this quote in an article on Guillaume Apollinaire, in order to point to Bergson's influence on him: "*Ob nun Materie, ob Geist, die Wirklichkeit erscheint als eine stete Verwandlung, sie wird, oder sie entwirft, sie ist nie ein fertig gewordenes*" (Giedion-Welcker, [1942] 1973, 1989, 192). But also in general terms, this reference is relevant for Van Eyck's experience-oriented concept of space only in a very indirect way, since it rather points to the not so closely defined idea of reality as to be determined by continuous change.

⁶ The depth of my examination of Bergson's theory is determined by the aim to explaining the basis of Van Eyck's general philosophical perspective. Therefore, I confine myself to explain the essential content of his theory, leaving aside any theory-historical classification and critical discussion.

⁷ Vagt, 2014, 15.

⁸ Although Bergson clearly distinguishes intuition from intellect and stresses the essential significance of intuition to reveal, and thus to represent, "a deeper layer of human insight," he also acknowledges the significance of the latter. This is because, despite the different meaning and significance he ascribes to intuition and intellect, he regards them as complementary to each another.

⁹ Lacy, 1989, 17.

Moreover, Van Eyck adopts Bergson's particular approach to time, including the explicit juxtaposition to a rather intellectual understanding:

*Now the present should never be understood as the shifting a-dimensional instant between past and future or as a closed shifting frontier between what is no longer and not yet is, but as a temporal span experience, shifting in the continuum of consciousness where past and future converge. (...) It is when he experiences and participates fully, when his associative awareness charges and extends perception, rendering it transparent and profound through memory and anticipation, that he becomes aware of duration, i.e. of temporal depth.*¹⁰

In this sense, and still remaining within Bergson's approach, Van Eyck now describes 'duration' as 'interiorized' time, meaning as being '*broken up and made accessible*', as Lightelijn and Strauven remark.¹¹ At the same time, however, Van Eyck modifies Bergson's approach, because Bergson refers to duration as being intrinsically tied to a specific state or quality of consciousness, which is intuition. Van Eyck, however and even though he also explains duration as a specific quality of time and its perception - focuses on duration rather in terms of a qualitative part, and parcel of personhood, of human identity. For him, in 'interiorizing' time - in breaking it up and making it accessible - man is in harmony with himself, he is '*at home*':

*... as soon as man experiences duration, he senses himself contained in time – included – and time contained in him. In coinciding with time, furthermore, he coincides with himself. There is then no difference between sense of duration and sense of being, not for that matter between these and the sense of present, for the present is experienced as extending into the past and the future; past and future are created in the present. Thus implies self-realization. Yes, man is 'at home' in duration. But there is no room for him in 'closed time'. In the abstraction of the consecutive instant man loses his sense of dimension and hence also his identity.*¹²

For Van Eyck, this harmony moves into the center of interest. Correspondingly, also the 'interiorization' of time always implies this meaning to reach the state of being in harmony with oneself. Furthermore, he reinterprets the term duration by linking time, and its 'interiorization', to the term 'occasion' - and what further underlines a shift from perception *of* to experience *in* time. It is an experience that implies activity and interaction. Hence, with reference to Bergson's notion of duration Van Eyck eventually turns this notion in the direction of both identity- and activity-related experience. The perception of time in itself as such disappears from view.

1.4 'Interiorized' space

Next to this reinterpretation of Bergson's approach to time, Van Eyck now additionally transfers it onto space. And conform the shift from a sensuous perception of to identity-related experience in time, also in terms of space, he is not interested in the perception *of*, but in the identity-related experience *in* space. Consequently, he refers - unlike Bergson - not to space in itself but to 'place'; in other words, he refers to a location or area where that experience takes place, even if it is a built or otherwise physically defined space.¹³ Moreover, as regards time, in the quality of being, or rather providing, "place" for true experience, Van Eyck's space is "broken up and made accessible"—space is "interiorized." Here, he explicitly regards built space as merely one, despite there being a specific architectural way to enable this "interiorization". But whether or not built space is involved, with his notion of space as 'place', Van Eyck extends experience in time onto space. Inner time-related experience (occasion) gets linked to outer location, it gets 'spatialized'. As a consequence, place gets, as it were, 'temporalized'. As Francis Strauven also remarks, for Van Eyck place is, as a matter of principle, charged with duration:

¹⁰ Van Eyck, [1962] 2010, 74.

¹¹ Van Eyck, 2010, 466.

¹² Van Eyck, [1962] 2010, 74.

¹³ Due to this neutralization of space as such, Van Eyck eventually does not conflict with Bergson, for whom space was - as a matter of principle and as mentioned above - opposed to the realm of intuitive perception. However, the question, whether van Eyck's transformation of Bergson's approach to time on space, and the corresponding neutralization of the opposition between both, could be regarded as a continuation of Bergson's view, I leave aside here.

*Place, in order to be a space where man feels at home,' so Strauven, 'must also incorporate duration. It has to be a space which not only intermediates in-between here and there, but which induces a simultaneous consciousness of now and soon; a space which, like man himself, is imbued with memory and anticipation.'*¹⁴

As for Van Eyck the current moment of experience integrates memory and anticipation, the 'spatialization' of that experience implies the integration of various places, having been experienced both in the past and the present and set to be experienced in the future. As a result, in his experience-oriented concept of space, Van Eyck refers to space as space-time, and to space-time as a synthesis of 'place' and 'occasion', as an instantaneous synthesis of *various* places and related present, past, and future occasions. Additionally, those places imply different scales of space, as well as of architectural and urban quality. Eventually, Van Eyck links such an all-embracing 'interiorization' of space and time to the term 'labyrinthian clarity', wishing to express that experience in space and time implies both experiencing the multilayered complexity of places and simultaneously experiencing each place in its specific existence and identity:

*I have spoken of labyrinthian clarity, conscious of the fact that this may sound paradoxical (...) As soon as the labyrinthian impact is articulated by the instantaneous impact of places of real quality during the temporal span implied, rendering it comprehensible as a single complex impression when experienced several times, one can justly speak of labyrinthian clarity. Labyrinthian clarity implies consecutive impression simultaneously sensed through repeated experience. It implies that clarity of place articulation grows – should grow at least in time.'*¹⁵

1.5 I and You: Martin Buber's 'dialogical principle'

Using his reference to Buber's "dialogisches Prinzip" (dialogical principle), particularly centering on the concept of "Zwischen" (Between), the experience-oriented concept of space, as explained so far, is complemented, or rather filled, with a socio-spatial content, and the term "place" acquires a socio-spatial meaning.

Buber's 'dialogisches Prinzip', particularly the relational concept of 'Zwischen' (Between), represents an essential part of his 'anthropological' philosophy.¹⁶ The essential ambition of this philosophy was to reveal the 'essence' of man, the essence of personhood, tracing this philosophic-ontological problem back to the *anthropological* question about the mental existence of man in the world - the mental existence of the individual human subject in relation to nature and to other human beings, and eventually to God. This existence he defines as to be determined by the following principle and twofold nature of man: On the one hand, and by virtue of (the evolutionary development of) their mind, Buber sees humans as to mentally taking distance from the world, primarily from nature and, in the course of history, also from each other and god.¹⁷ This distance for Buber is determined by our consciousness in order to exist as an independent person (as ego), which is seen in the personal pronoun 'I'. Owing to this 'distance', the individual human subject frees itself, unlike animals, from the surrounding world, which now turns out to be a counterpart, a vis-à-vis, an object-like world, which, says Buber, we consequently refer as an 'It' world.

On the other hand, however, Buber assigns man the (just as inborn) nature to establish another kind of relationship with the world. That relationship counteracts that distance and allows man to realize an immediate relation *with* the world. In this immediate relationship we (potentially) refer to the world as 'You', and not only to other human beings, as Buber explicitly points out, though in our relationship to other humans '*what confronts us has blossomed into the full reality of the Thou.*'¹⁸ Contrary to the 'It', the 'You' (the 'I-You' relationship) expresses our subjective identification, our dedication to and communion with the

¹⁴ Strauven, [1994] 1998, 419.

¹⁵ Van Eyck [1962] 2010, 100.

¹⁶ To explain both the principle and the concept, I refer to three of his main texts (to which Van Eyck and other members of Team 10 also referred): *Ich und Du* (I and Thou) from 1923, *Urdistanz und Beziehung* (Primordial Distance and Relation) from 1951, and *Das Problem des Menschen* (The Problem of Man) from 1942. As with Bergson, the depth of my examination of Buber's philosophy is determined by the primary aim to understand and to evaluate Van Eyck's reference to him. Therefore, in the following I again restrict myself to explaining the essential content of the mentioned theory and concepts, leaving aside any critical discussion.

¹⁷ Due to the intrinsic relation to man's evolutionary 'Menschwerdung' (incarnation), Buber defines this distance as 'Urdistanz' (primordial distance).

¹⁸ Buber, [1923] 1957, 148. Quoted from the translated edition, Edinburg, 1937, 103.

vis-à-vis, with the world, and eventually with God, as the origin and condition of both our (mind-oriented) existence and that of the world. It simply distinguishes us, according to Buber, as to be *human*. Eventually Buber claims that the 'I-It' and the 'I-You' relationships have to complement one another as the two principle modes of our conditionality in the world and as determining the essence of personhood.

But to his day, according to his diagnosis, the history of mankind has been characterized by a progressive disappearance of the 'I-You' principle, of the forming of an immediate relationship with the world. Therefore he pleads for strengthening the 'You' principle, first and foremost with regard to inter-subjective relationships between human beings themselves. Here he identifies the 'I-You' relationship with the term 'Zwischen' (Between), which is to be understood as a mental sphere that comes into being as soon as two persons really turn towards each other and perceive each other as 'You', and not as 'It', as him or her, and correspondingly suspend any distance between them.

Next to his focus on inter-subjective relationships (and next to the implied religious connotation), Buber refers to the term 'Zwischen' in a second respect, namely the so-called 'Gestalt gewordenes Zwischen' (physically shaped between). Here he particularly identifies a work of art as the '*condensation of the relationship of man with the world*,'¹⁹ and as a result and expression of the same twofold 'I-It' and 'I-You' relation to the world - to move away from it as well as to relate oneself to it in an immediate way. In this sense, he describes, for instance, music as the continuous interplay between '*the distant discovery of tonal existence and its 'beziehungshafte' release into formed appearance*.'²⁰

1.6 Aldo van Eyck's notion of 'In-between'

Van Eyck adopts the concept of "Zwischen" as an alternative conception of personhood that focuses either on individualism or on collectivism. Here he completely follows Buber's criticism and his valuation of the concept of "Zwischen" as the necessary alternative for both:

*Modern individualism is an imaginary structure – this is why it fails. Collectivism is the final barrier man has thrown up against himself to substitute. There is only one reality between real persons – what Buber calls 'the real third' (...) not something that happens to one person or another person separately and a neutral world containing all things, but something that happens between both in a dimension only accessible to both. The in-between acquiring form. 'On the other side of the subjective, on this side of the objective, on the narrow borderline where I and you meet lies the 'In-between.'*²¹

At the same time, as with his reference to Bergson's notion of 'durée', Van Eyck transforms Buber's concept of 'Zwischen'. He transforms it from a non-spatial to a spatial concept. From the perspective of his experience-oriented concept of space, this transformation complements his notion of 'interiorization'. Here, it particularly fills the term 'occasion' with a social or rather socio-psychological content, both in terms of immediate human interaction and in terms of the relation of man to the world.²² With regard to the latter, and taking the beach as an example, the borderline between land and ocean turns into an "In-between" realm. In the paragraph titled "*Our natural Affinity with the In-.between,*" he also argues in *The Child, the City, and the Artist*:

Take off your shoes and walk along a beach through the ocean's last thin sheet of water gliding landwards and seawards. You feel reconciled in a way you wouldn't feel if there were a forced dialogue between you and either one or the other of these great phenomena. For here, in-between land and ocean –

¹⁹ Buber, [1950] 1957, 418.

²⁰ Ibid, 418.

²¹ Van Eyck, [1961] 2010, 54.

²² Due to Buber's clear connection of experience with the 'I-It'-relation of man to the world, and the corresponding separation between experience and the concept of *Zwischen*, Van Eyck's transformation seems to imply a fundamental contradiction with Buber's argumentation. However, the English term experience unites two different terms in German: 'Erleben' and 'Erfahrung'. As 'Erleben' implies a certain degree of activity and an orientation to the outside, 'Erfahrung' rather implies perception in terms of an inner reflection. Buber exclusively uses experience in the latter meaning. Van Eyck uses experience without to distinguish between 'Erfahrung' and 'Erleben'. Furthermore, one could question Buber's strict connection between 'Erfahrung' and the 'I-It' relation with the world, since the *Zwischen* always also is an experience in terms of 'Erleben'.

*in this in-between realm – something happens to you (...) you coincide with both, because their coincidence is you.*²³

This transformation of Buber's concept of 'Zwischen' represents a first concretization of what one could think of as being the experience of place, as it represents a foundation of its ontological meaning - in the example of the beach, the experience of departing and homecoming.

In concrete architectural terms, the 'Zwischen' turns into an architecturally created 'In-between'. The most prominent example of this is the threshold, or 'doorstep', the spatial zone between inside and outside. As an 'In-between' place - and similar to the borderline between land and ocean - the 'doorstep' also establishes, or should establish, a dialogue. Now this dialogue is the socio-spatial relation between private inside and public outside of the house. In his Otterloo talk in 1959, Van Eyck accordingly argues:

There is one more thing that has been growing in my mind since the Smithsons uttered the word 'doorstep' at Aix. It hasn't left me ever since. I have been mulling over it, expanding the meaning as far as I could stretch it. I have gone so far as to identify it as a symbol with what architecture means as such and should accomplish. To establish the 'in-between' is to reconcile conflicting polarities. Provide the place where they can interchange and you reestablish the original dual-phenomena. I called this 'la plus grande réalité du seuil' in Dubrovnic. Martin Buber calls it 'das Gestalt gewordene Zwischen'. ...

*Take an example: the world of the house with me inside and you outside or vice versa, there is also the world of the street – the city – with you inside and me outside or vice versa. Get what I mean: two worlds clashing, no transition. The individual on one side, the collective on the other. Between the two, society in general throws up lots of barriers, whilst architects in particular are so poor in spirit that they provide doors two inches thick and six foot high (flat surfaces in a flat surface of glass as often as not.) (...) Every time we pass through a door like that, we are split in two – but we don't take notice anymore. Is that the reality of a door? What then is the greater reality of the door? Well perhaps it is the localized setting for a wonderful human gesture: conscious entry and departure. That's what a door is: something that frames your coming and going, for it is a vital experience for those that do so but also for those encountered or left behind. A door is a place made for an occasion that is repeated millions of times in a lifetime between the first entry and the last exist.*²⁴

Leaving aside that Van Eyck misinterprets Buber's concept of 'Gestalt gewordenes Zwischen' - turning 'Gestalt gewordenes Zwischen' into a built equivalent of the intersubjective 'Zwischen', instead of referring to it as an artistic examination of man with the material world, with nature - this quote well exemplifies that he conceives the designed inside-outside relation as an immediately experienced relation, as the experience of coming and going. Here, for Van Eyck the sensuous perception of architectural space in its physic spatial appearance does not seem to have any value. It is the identity-related experience of belonging and of encounter that counts, *'the encounter between the worlds - two areas, the encounter between me and the outside world, the encounter between me and the fellow human being.'*²⁵ However, Van Eyck's experience-oriented approach to space, its 'interiorization' eventually very well includes the perception of spatiality, even though it does so at the level of spatial sensation.

1.7 Spatial sensation

In *The Child, the City and the Artist*, Van Eyck repeats his fundamental statement that 'space' in the image of man is 'place': *'if space allows people to be alive in, it will 'become' place (...) Place is the appreciation of space, that is how I see it.'*²⁶ Unlike similar statements, he now connects the appreciation of 'place' with a criticism of the (one-sided) 'modernist' focus on spatial continuity at the expense of the forming of spatial enclosure, and traces the need for both back to two aspects of man's primordial nature':

*There is the spatial sensation, which makes us envy birds in flight; there is also the kind that recalls the sheltered enclosure of our origin. Architecture will defeat its own end if it discards either the one or the other of these great human aspects.*²⁷

²³ Van Eyck, [1962] 2010, 56.

²⁴ Van Eyck, [1961] 2010, 204.

²⁵ Forum 1960 3, 265, 266.

²⁶ Van Eyck [1962] 2010, 67.

²⁷ Ibid, 67.

Even though Van Eyck himself here does not explicitly link spatial sensation to what has been explained as 'interiorized' space, he nonetheless incorporates the phenomenon of spatial sensation into this experience-oriented approach to space, even giving it an essential meaning in the experience of space as 'place'. By so doing, he also links to the experience of 'place' the perception of spatiality, of relative enclosure, and openness. However, and illustrating the specific nature of Van Eyck's experience-oriented approach to space both in general and architectural terms, with his reference to 'spatial sensation' he rather subordinates the perception of spatiality into that identity-oriented experiencing *in* space. Accordingly, he links the creation and experience of inside atmosphere to the experience of well-being, of feeling comfortable, and compares it with a corresponding quality of clothing. This explains why he uses the term 'spatial sensation', and does not refer to a sensation, or perception, of spatiality in itself.

Next to this, Van Eyck identifies the sensation of enclosure, and openness, as representing, in their interrelated existence, the fundamental existence of man in space and time, and, eventually, in its coincidence with the fundamental principle of reality as a whole, which is relativity.²⁸ In this context, he directly links the sensation of spatial enclosure and openness with human breathing. In his famous '*breathing both in and out*' aphorism, demanding an architecture that, as humans, also should breathe both in and out, he accordingly argues:

There are two fundamental kinds of spatial sensation that are compatible with man's primordial nature. They must always been present somehow in what we make - both at once. That is why I have conjured the breathing image and keep asking: when is architecture going to breathe in and out - i.e. just breathe. There is the spatial sensation, which makes us envy birds in flight; there is also the kind that recalls the sheltered enclosure of our origin. (...) The In-between realm provides for both aspects simultaneously.²⁹

1.8 Conclusion

Based on Bergson's philosophical approach, and particularly on his perspective on time, Van Eyck refers to space in terms of its 'interiorization', an interiorization of space in unity with that of time. Here, he regards architecture as a means of framing, or enabling, this. Linking this conception to Buber's notion of 'Zwischen,' the experience *in* space and time gets linked to the realm of human self-experience in the world, to inter-human and socio-spatial relations, and, by so doing, it gets in ontological sense substantiated. By simultaneously transferring also Buber's approach onto space, and particularly on architectural design, Buber's 'Zwischen' turns into an architecture-spatial 'In-between'.³⁰ Here, Van Eyck consequently conceives that 'In-between' as to establishing socio-spatial relations and as to enabling their experience. However, this notion of space as the experience of concrete places and occasions *in* space and time, of belonging and socio-spatial relation, includes a reference to the perception of space, that is, to the sensation of spatiality, of relative enclosure, and openness. As a result, it is the implicit combination of both - that is, the modification of a sensation of spatiality as a self-experience *in* space - that essentially characterizes van Eyck' approach to space, and from which also follows his reference to space formation.

²⁸ As indicated above, even though the reference to the concept of relativity is essential to entirely understand Van Eyck's understanding and use of the concept of 'In-between', in this paper I do not go into this aspect of Van Eyck's theory.

²⁹ Van Eyck [1962] 2010, 67. According to Georges Teyssot (Teyssot, 2013, 158-160), particularly the analogy between breathing human beings and breathing architecture reveals the mimetic approach that characterizes Van Eyck's argumentation. To my opinion - and without wishing to value Van Eyck's reference to the term breathing - it is *not* the moment of mimesis (in the sense of imitation) that characterizes Van Eyck's reference to human breathing. Rather and in line what has been explained above, Van Eyck uses the term breathing as a metaphor, a metaphor that symbolizes the principle demand to design in accordance with what Van Eyck regards as the fundamental relation of man to space. A congruence that he, in turn, conceives to be imbedded in a congruence of architecture, man and the fundamental nature of reality: the principle of 'relativity'.

³⁰ However, Buber himself had already linked his concept of "Zwischen" to architecture. In this respect, Georges Teyssot points to Buber's foreword in Erwin Anton Gutkind's *Community and Environment* (1953): 'A discourse on Social Ecology,' where he states that '*The architects must be given the task to build for human contact, to build an environment which invites human meetings and centers which give these meetings meaning and render them productive.*' (Teyssot, 2013, 158.)

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